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Administrative Adjudications in New Jersey: Why Not
Let the ALJ Decide?*
By Richard M. Hluchan

A client approaches you with a tale of woe. It seems that he
purchased a beautiful bay front lot on Long Beach Island, intending to
construct his dream vacation home. He since has discovered that a
portion of the property consists of fresh-water wetlands, and has
applied to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a
permit to fill them. DEP denied the permit. The client wants you to
challenge the denial.
You file your request for a “contested case” hearing, and an
administrative law judge (ALJ) is assigned to the case. After
extensive preparation, the hearing day arrives. You present your
witnesses, and introduce expert testimony and documentation to
demonstrate that your client is entitled to a permit. A deputy attorney
general (DAG) representing DEP presents testimony and evidence in
support of DEP’s denial.
Several weeks later, you receive the ALJ’s written decision.
The ALJ found that your witnesses were credible and that your client
is entitled to a permit to fill the wetlands. Your client is ecstatic, and
wants to immediately begin construction.
Not so fast. Your client forgot the admonition you gave him
at the outset of the case. The ALJ’s decision is not a final decision,
but merely a recommendation. The final decision will subsequently
be rendered by the DEP commissioner.
Your client is incredulous. “How can DEP be both prosecutor
and judge in the same case? Isn’t it unfair that the boss of the people
who denied the permit in the first place makes the final decision?”
Is it, indeed, fair? In this particular case, 1 the commissioner
* This article was first published in the October/November 1996 issue of
the New Jersey Law Journal and is republished here with permission. Copyright
1996. ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
1

Zaloom v. NJDEP, 92 NJAR2d (EPE) 50 (1992).
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reversed the ALJ and found that the client was not entitled to a
wetlands permit. The client was compelled to appeal to the Appellate
Division to obtain the permit. Total cost: three years, substantial
dollars for legal fees and costs, and a frustrated and disgruntled client
who lost his remaining respect for New Jersey’s administrative
process.
For the average litigant in the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL), it seems unfair that the ALJ who personally conducts the trial,
hears the witnesses, assesses their credibility, examines the exhibits
and is intimately familiar with all aspects of the case cannot
definitively decide the matter in controversy. Rather, the agency head,
whose employees decided to deny the license, or to prosecute an
alleged regulatory violation or assess a penalty in the first place, has
the exclusive right under law to render a final decision. 2
While the present system may seem unfair, it is a far cry from
the system it replaced. Prior to 1978, when the OAL was created, 3
contested cases before state agencies were heard in the first instance
by hearing examiners who were employees of the very agency that
took the action that led to the case. Such hearings were often held
within the cozy confines of the agency’s offices. As noted by the
Supreme Court:
The use of agency employees to conduct hearings and
determine the evidential record in contested cases
involving claims against the agency fostered an
institutional bias in favor of the agency that
undermines the fairness and impartiality of
administrative adjudication. 4
It was in response to such perceived unfairness that the OAL
was created. As an independent corps of hearing officers known as
administrative law judges, the OAL was hailed as a new system of
administrative adjudication that would promote justice through
uniformity and independence, bring impartiality and objectivity to
agency hearings, and ultimately achieve higher levels of fairness in
administrative adjudications. 5
2

N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 et seq.
4
In re Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 90 (1982).
5
Id.
3
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While the creation of the OAL was a giant step toward
efficiency, consistency, fairness and independence in the conduct of
state administrative hearings, it is nonetheless clear that the
Legislature never intended to alter the basic regulatory authority of
state agencies. Final administrative adjudication continues to be the
responsibility of the agency head. The rationale is that administrative
agencies are not judicial tribunals, and thus, even in their adjudicatory
role, simply are not a neutral forum whose function is solely to decide
the controversy presented to it. Rather, as a part of the executive
branch of government, administrative agencies are charged with
faithfully executing the law through their regulatory and rulemaking
functions. Administrative adjudication, according to this thesis, is
simply one aspect of regulatory power. Thus, although agencies
adjudicate individual disputes and determine individual rights under
law, they do so as part of a regulatory, not judicial, process over
which the agency head must maintain overall control. 6
So great is the perceived need for control by the agency head
that OAL practice has spawned modes of procedure that would not be
tolerated within the court system. For example, unless an agency head
is tainted by “actual bias,” he or she may render a final decision in
any matter. 7 “Actual bias” is an exacting standard, and will be found
only in the rare circumstance when, for example, the decisionmaker
has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the matter, or has been the
target of personal criticism from one seeking relief. 8 Thus, an agency
head may render a decision, and need not recuse him or herself, even
if he or she has become familiar with the facts of the case through the
performance of administrative duties, has announced an opinion on a
disputed issue in the case, or has conducted an investigation and
formulated a policy position before the ALJ has conducted the trial. 9
The “appearance of impropriety” standard applicable to judges is
inapplicable in the administrative adjudicative context.
The perceived need for administrative control also has given
rise to special accommodations for the state’s lawyers, which would
never be permitted to private practitioners. In the typical
administrative enforcement or license action, a DAG represents both
6

Id. at 91.
In re Carberry, 114 N.J. 574, 585 (1989).
8
Id. at 586.
9
Id. at 585.
7
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the prosecutor and the ultimate decisionmaker. Although an attorney
representing a litigant before a superior court judge is not permitted to
make ex parte contact with the court, different rules have been carved
out in the OAL context.
While expressing concern that the impartiality of the agency
head be maintained, the Supreme Court has nonetheless given its
blessing to ex parte contacts between the prosecuting DAG and the
client agency head in the midst of OAL proceedings. 10 Perhaps
acknowledging that it is thereby condoning an irregular and
potentially unfair situation, the Court asks litigants to have faith that
“DAGs and agency heads will be cautious and circumspect in
deciding whether ex parte communications are necessary, and will
ensure that such communications do not threaten the fairness of the
proceedings.” 11
The Supreme Court did place some limits on such ex parte
contacts. Once an ALJ renders the initial decision, and the agency
head is thus actively reviewing the matter prior to rendering a final
decision, the DAG who prosecuted the matter no longer may
communicate with the agency head. However, the Court allows
another DAG, from the very same office, to advise the agency head
whether to accept or reject the legal arguments of his colleague.
During this period, an artificial wall must be erected between the
DAGs. 12
One cannot conceive of such a situation in a judicial forum.
But this is how the state’s lawyers in the administrative adjudication
system are expected to routinely function. The ease with which
unscrupulous individuals could engage in improper ex parte contacts
or breach the artificial wall, undetected by the public, is apparent.
Other facets of the adjudicative process, which are vastly
different from those experienced in the trial court, facilitate agency
control. For example, in order to maintain the efficiency and
flexibility of administrative hearings, no formal rules of evidence are
utilized.13 Hearsay is routinely admitted into evidence as a “common
practice.” 14 Thus, evidence which might normally be inadmissible in
court is routinely admitted in OAL proceedings, unless the ALJ finds
10

Matter of Opinion No. 583, 107 N.J. 230 (1987).
Id. at 239.
12
Id. at 239-40.
13
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(a).
14
Matter of Toth, 175 N.J. Super. 254, 262 (App. Div. 1980).
11
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that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will necessitate undue time or create a substantial danger
of undue prejudice or confusion.
Moreover, the full panoply of discovery rights is not available
to OAL litigants. Depositions, for example, are unavailable as a
matter of right, and may be taken only if the ALJ permits. 15 Such
motions are routinely opposed by DAGs and, more often than not, are
denied, even in complex cases where substantial economic interests
are at stake.
The requirement that agency heads retain final
decisionmaking authority in administrative adjudicative matters is
often justified by the perceived need to administer complex policy in
a uniform and efficient manner. Only by maintaining final
adjudicative authority, it is reasoned, can an agency ensure that its
statutory mission and regulatory pronouncements are uniformly
applied. To this end, the experience, technical competence and
specialized knowledge of the agency are utilized in evaluating
evidence and rendering a decision. 16 The underlying premise is, that
the agency has specialized technical knowledge which only it can
properly apply. In fact, such technical evidence and knowledge
should be presented to the ALJ and subjected to cross-examination
and rebuttal during the hearing, like any other technical evidence
presented to any other neutral decisionmaker in any other forum.
Further underscoring the agency head’s control over the
proceedings, and contributing to the appearance that the system is
unfair, is the manner in which initial decisions of an ALJ are
reviewed by the agency head and turned into final decisions. The law
contemplates that after the ALJ renders the initial decision, the parties
have the opportunity to file exceptions, objections and replies thereto,
and to present arguments to the head of the agency, either orally or in
writing, after which “the head of the agency, upon a review of the
record submitted by the administrative law judge, shall adopt, reject
or modify the recommended report and decision” within 45 days. 17
One conjures up the image of an agency head, much like a superior
court judge, poring over transcripts, exhibits, briefs and exceptions,
15

N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.2(c).
Matter of Silberman, 169 N.J. Super. 243, 256 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d,
84 N.J. 303 (1980).
17
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).
16
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and carefully drafting a written final decision.
The system rarely, if ever, works this way. Agency
subordinates, with assistance from DAGs, review some or all of the
record and prepare a draft decision for the commissioner’s signature.
How much time a commissioner personally spends on a given matter
will vary from case to case. Seldom do agency heads hear oral
argument on a matter, or otherwise take a hands-on approach. Given
the demands on cabinet officers and other high officials, they simply
cannot devote more than a fraction of the time necessary for a
complete review. The oft-quoted administrative law maxim that “the
one who decides must hear” 18 has never been literally applied under
New Jersey’s system. Agency heads are not even required to read the
entire record or transcript. They need only “consider and appraise”
the record in rendering a decision. 19
CONCLUSION
Administrative agencies are entrusted today with far more
extensive and pervasive regulatory responsibilities than they were
when the OAL was created. Regulatory requirements govern far more
aspects of our personal and business lives that they did in 1978. The
interests at stake also are far more valuable today. DEP, for example,
has utilized the administrative adjudicatory process to assess penalties
in excess of $1 million.
When the Legislature took the first step by creating an
independent corps of administrative law judges in 1978, it acted to
inject a sense of fairness and propriety into an administrative
adjudication system which needed it. After almost 20 years of
experience with the OAL, it is time to take the next logical step to
further enhance fairness and to provide needed confidence in the
system, by removing final decisionmaking authority from agency
heads and vesting it in ALJs. It is time to completely eliminate all
vestiges of the “institutional bias in favor of the agency” and, just as
importantly, eliminate the appearance of unfairness.
Agency heads might still render final decisions in cases in
which they are truly impartial arbiters. Thus, for example, in a dispute
between a teacher and a local school board, the commissioner of
education still could render a decision perceived to be fair based upon
18
19

Morgan v. US, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed. 1288 (1936).
Matter of Morrison, 216 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 1987).
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an initial decision and record compiled by an administrative law
judge.
In the more familiar circumstances, however, where an agency
acts as both prosecutor and judge, fundamental fairness by today’s
standards is violated. The appearance of unfairness breeds contempt
for, and a lack of confidence in, the system. There is no reason why
final decision-making authority cannot be entrusted to the ALJ in
such cases.

